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I saw this guy on the train I And he seemed to gave gotten stucki In one of those 
abstract trances.! And he was going: "Ugh... Ugh... Ugh... " And Fred said: I 
"/ think he's in some kind ofpain. I I think it's a pain cry." I And I said: "Pain 
cry? I Then language is a virus." Language! It's a virus! I Language! It's a 
virus! 
- Laurie Anderson, Language is a Virus 
this paper is written with the anticipation Ofthe reader having a 
basic knowledge ofwittgenstein' s philosophy. thisjrees mejrom 
haVing to define terms and waste space (and thereby limiting the 
reader with my definitions. their understanding ofthe topics will 
be read into the paper regardless ofthe safeguards i place on it 
with definitions and handholding, but i find this to be a good 
thing, as the number of interpretations of my point may grow 
then, and the differences will be over the argument itselfand not 
the terms which surround it. don't discuss the depth grammar 
within the game.) much of what i am going to say will seem 
obvious, but sometimes the obvious is what is overlooked. by tlte 
way: i'm not using private language here (though i am writing it 
to myself- in English). 
I. Private Language 
1. Isolating the Private Language Argument is like removing a stone from 
a wall, then pointing to the stone and saying "This is a walL" Exposing the 
Private Language Argument is like pointing at a stone in a wall and saying 
"This is part of a wall." The difference is that one remains grounded in its 
place, and the place defines it-it is recognized in its relation to the place. 
The other is seen without a context. Without the place, it is senseless.1 
I I urn in agreement with Kripke when he says" ... we will only increase our difficult 
argument ifwe call §243 onward 'the private language argument' and study ilin isolation from 
the preceding material" (Kripke, p. 81). However, this is not to say it should not be done to 
understand its place in the work as a whole. If it is done to separate it from the rest of the work: 
that is where the problem lies. However, Kripke makes this mistake himself: he discusses the 
private Janguage argument in Willgenstein on Rules and Private Languages while ignoring 
the preceding statements and paragraphs in the Philosophicallnvestigati011S. He does not 
take his own advice and warnings. 
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The Private Language Argument is Wittgensteln's attack on tradi­
tional philosophical methods and philosophicallanguage-games,2 and his 
attemptto show their lack ofmeaning and sense. He was striking at the roots 
of the philosophical project as ithad grown over the past 2,500 years or so, 
attempting to prune itback so it could grow strong this time, and not twisted 
and weak, as he saw it to be. He exposed the propensity of philosophers to 
argue over points which are not applicable to much of anything,3 and how 
they do not seem to be In contact with the real world, and would prefer to 
believe their theories rather than what they had seen.4Wittgenstein was able 
to use it as both an argument to support his stand on the other topics he 
discusses in the Philosophical Investigations and as an example of the 
problems he was attacking. 
2. Private Language: what is it, and how does it relate to the rest of 
Wittgenstein? This is the question that must first be investigated when we 
discuss private language as discussed in the Philosophical Investigations. 
Without an understanding of how it relates to the rest of the text, the 
argumentis left suspended from nothing. The supports from a structure must 
notbe removed: they then become useless (they aren't supporting anything) 
and the structure will collapse. Using the supports in another structure can 
be done only if a) the structure is designed to incorporate the support, or, b) 
the support is modified to work within the structure. The Private Language 
Argument, I hold, only fits within Wittgenstein' s overall structure when left 
unmodified. Even lfthe supports are removed to study it, unless one knows 
how it works with the rest of the structure it will beunclear as to what itdoes 
exactly. It is only effective as it is within the environment that was created 
for it. Therefore, the Private Language Argument cannot be removed from 
the Philosophical Investigations and stand on its own, just as the surface 
grammar of a language game cannot be seen out of cOntext and still be 
intelligible. Ex.: You are Sitting in a room and you hear snippets of 
2Including his Theory of Language in the Tractatus. and the rest of the Tractatus also. 
He is not simply going after other philosophers: he is going after himself in the past, and that 
past self was a traditional philosopher to the COte-an obvious target for him to go aflcr. 
JWilness the "Angels on the Head of a Pin" debate which was once so popular in 
philosophical circles, but has now been superseded by relativism and SuperSkepticism: how 
many ways can we look at something without seeing it? 
4 See: Skepticism 
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conversation coming out of the next room. To speculate on the meaning of 
these snippets is nearly impossIble, as you are hearing them out of context, 
and are not actively in the game.sThe following illustration pictures how 
Language Games can be compared to the use of the Private Language 
Argument in the Philosophical Investigations. 
Wittgenstein's use of the PrivateLanguage Argumentis subtle. His 
use is careful and planned, and 1) it holds a central place in the construction 
ofhis book, taking up a great deal ofspace (both physically and idea-wise), 
and 2) it is one of his central arguments in his assault on the Tractatus. It Is 
both interesting and important to note that he did not mark itoffas aseparate 
chapter or section. He left it in as part of the rest of the text, flowing right 
along with it (no breaks allowed), further backing up my claim (textually) 
that the argument cannot stand on its own as it is senseless on its own. Both 
the form ofthe text and its content lead me to believe this. Ex.: considerhow 
the Tractatus would read if one of the sections were removed. 
3. The Language itself ... what language games could exist in a private 
language? How would the grammar hold together? It seems to me from 
reading On Certainty that as our experiences are what we can base our 
thinking upon, our experiences show us that language is a group activity. 
Therc is no need whatsoever for a private language, as one would not have 
to tell oneself something: onc· is aware: 
Olher people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from 
my behaviour,-for Icannotbe said to learn of them. Ihave them. 
(PI, §246) 
The question is complete nonsense ifone thinks ofthe idea oflanguagebeing 
learned and then later the question pops up: it is never there to begin with, 
but comes back later; it is a philosophical question. It is not a thinking 
question. It leads to statements (said in all sincerity and honesty) such as "I 
know that is a tree." These statements are said as if they prove something or 
verify something, as if they proved what was said or that they mean more 
than they say. They are not treated as they actually function in reality: as 
statements attempting to reference the depth grammar. There is no need to 
5To be actively in a language game does not require one to be actively involved but to 
simply know what the game is. That is why it is so hard to break into the middle of a 
conversation and still be able to make intelligible comments or to enter the flow of the 
dialogue. 
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reference the depth grammar (itis there, itis a given in the game), but as that 
is being done, the statement can only function as a statement and not as a 
proposition. Are either necessary when one deals with oneself, when one 
talks to oneself? Would the language one uses in discussing matters with 
oneself be the same as the language used when discussing matters with 
others who speak the same language? One does not need to tell oneself the 
statements (just as they are unnecessary in a language game) and one does 
not need to deliberate with oneself in a language, and ifone does, it is my 
experience that intuition plays a key role in the process, and if the delibera­
tion is done with language, we take two sides, we deliberate with ourselves 
with us taking both the selfand other places in the argument.1i 
4. §256-"But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensa­
tion, but only had the sensation?" (PI). Ifthere in no natural expression, i.e., 
language in common with other people, does that mean that a private 
language in not a natural expression forWittgenstein? I think so. A private 
language is terribly unnatural.7 
5. Why is it that Wittgenstein seems to feel a need for some sort oflogical 
argument vs. private language when he seems to have a common sense 
argument in his other arguments?8 Perhaps he is anticipating those who want 
the philosophical answer. §275 seems to me to be a cutting comment: 
275. Look at the blueofthe sky and say to yourself "How blue the 
sky is1"-When you do it spontaneously-without philosophical 
intentions-the idea never crosses yourmind that this impression 
of colour belongs only to you. And you have no hesitation in 
exclaiming that to someone else. And ifyou point at anything as 
you say the words you point at the sky. I am saying: you have not 
the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 
'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private 
language.' Nor do you think that really you ought not to point to 
the color with your hand, but with your attention. (Consider what 
it means "to point to something with the attention.") (PI) 
6Can it be otherwise, and if so, 'does it remain deliberation? 
7To not have a "natural expression for a sensation" is to be Ayer's Crusoe-but not on 
Ayer's tenns. This is Ayer's Crusoe on Wittgenstein's lenns. Aquestion is leftlo be answered: 
is a man without language truly a human for Wittgenstein? 
•Albeit his is an extremely logical common sense argwnent, but is it then still common 
sense? 
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II. The Private Language Argument 
6. "5.6 The Umitso/my language mean the limits of my world" (1L~p).9In 
the early Wittgenstein, a private language limits the world to what is 
sensed.10 This removes the outer language, as the private language would 
constrain the outer language, andone could not express anything in theouter 
language that could not be expressed in the private language. The private 
language would have to be extraordinarily complex for a person to commu~ 
nicate with others if this would be the case.11 The communication between 
the public and private: would there not be something lost between the two? 
(Isn't there anyway?) 
"5.62 ... The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the 
limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the 
limits of my world" (1L-P). These are the beginnings of the problem.l2 
7.§243-You can talk to yourself, but in what language is that discussion? 
My experience shows me I talk to myself in English, my native tongue. If 
I used a private language, would I not have to translate everything between 
the two if I wanted to communicate with somcone else? Also: why would 
one want to have a language to use with oneseifabout something one already 
knows (though, as Wlttgcnstein states, you do not know you are in pain, you 
simply are), that is, the sensations? 
8.§246-"The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they 
doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myselr' (PI). Language 
is communication, not only of thoughts and arguments but ofinformation: 
there is no need to communicate information with oneself-discuss, delib~ 
erate, debate, those can (and should) be done, but to communicate informa­
tion one has with oneself is nonsensical. One cannot doubt the information 
one has (the veracity of it, perhaps) but not what it is, as in the case of 
sensations. You do not know, you have. I3 
9 Does this imply that I cannot expand my world without expanding my language? Can 
we not sense or respond to something if we do not have it in our language? 
lOIs reading sensing? 
II A person would have to have a rich private language lind an amazing amount of 
sensations allowed by their private language if they were to communicate those experiences 
with others or they would be in danger of continually being passed over in silence/passing 
over in silence. 
11Ifit wasn't for 5.62 in the TL.P, Wittgenstcin might not have had this to deal with, I'd 
imagine. 
13 §249-Lying? Ue to yourself in your own private language? "(Lying is a language· 
game that needs to be learned like any other one)" (Pl). If this is true, where did one learn to 
lie to oneself? 
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9. I believe thatI have covered enough ofthe argumentto illustrate my point. 
Wittgenstein is illustrating his argument with illustrated arguments. He has 
shown how traditional philosophy asks needless questions that cause far 
more problems than they start. The debate over "can there be a Private 
Language?" is silly (Wittgenstein knows this) as the questions are 
philosphical, and are not asked except by immature minds (Oe, §§310-317). 
Questions about things one cannot doubt (Am I feeling this feeling I feel 
right now?) are meaningless. 
10. To RecapitulateIRestateJ Add: Ifthe Private Language argument is taken 
out of context, taken out of the Philosphical Investigations, the "Depth 
Grammar" of the argument (the rest of the book) is ignored, and therefore 
the argument itself is without any relevance whatsoever. The argument must 
be taken in context, and if it is not, the argument is either Unintelligible, 
because of the missing depth grammar (a fish out of water) or it means 
something completely different than it originally did due to new depth 
grammar surrounding it. 
III. Private Relations 
/flanguage were liquid/ It would be rushing in/ Instead here we are / In silence 
more eloquent / Than any word could ever be 
Words are too solid / They don't move jast enough/To catch the blur in the 

brain / 111at flies by and is gone / Gone / Gone / Gone 

I'd like to meet you / In a timeless / Placeless place / S01newhere out ojcontext / 

And beyond all consequences 

I won't USe words again/They don't mean what I meant/They don't say what I 

said / They're just the crust ojthe meaning / With realms underneath 

/ Never touched / Never stirred/ Never even moved through 

--SuzanneVega,Language 
11. Suppose I tell someone who has never read any Wittgenstein about thc 
Private Language Argument. Their first reaction will be "Thatis silly. There 
is no reason for an argument against private language, as thcre cannot be 
one. I do not have one, and have never met anyone claiming to have one." 
Wittgenstein makes a good argument against private language (as shown 
earlier) but his prime argument is not against private language, but against 
philosophy. He also says (essentially) "This (the Private Language idea) is 
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silly, "but "'This" is both Private Language andPhilosophy for Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein wants thinking. not incoherent questions/discussions,14 
12. "Meaningless" A Private Language would be meaningless even ifthere 
was one-consider how, as Wittgenstein points out, I do not say, "I know 
I have a pain" in order to let myself know-I Simply have the pain. See §246 
as this is so-why would we have a personal language to discuss our 
sensations with ourselves? "Oh I think that hurts-let me check-oh yes, I 
feel S." It does not work that way. We feel it-and do we discuss the pain 
with ourselves? No. We discuss eliminating it-in fact, I would not call it 
"discussing" - we run over a list ofpossible responses to the pain we have 
built up over time to deal with pain, gained from our experiences. Discussion 
comes when we deal with someone else. We only deliberate in conscious 
language over something when we are planning to express it to someone 
else. We have no need to explain itto ourselves. The raw data our minds deal 
with is not kept from our minds by a private language-our minds deal 
directly with it. This is what makes expressing our feelings sohard-wefeel. 
and as we do not have aninner language, we musttake the raw data and move 
it into the language wc wish to express ourselves in. Ifwe did not, we could 
translatc between our inner language and the outer one we speak. But there 
is no need to. What we lose in meaning we gain in speed. To act quickly 
means that our processing time must be kept to a minimum. A language 
between us and our sense would mean we could not react quickly.I5 
13. AJ. Ayer, for example, Iifis the Pri v ate Language Argument directly out 
of the Philosophical Investigations in his essay "Can There Be a Private 
Language?" and seems to understand it in terms of a language used for 
communication between entities. for he says" ... it is obvious that there can 
be private languages. There can be, because there are" (Pitcher, p. 250). He 
immediately assumes the existence ofsuch a language, which makes him at 
once unable to see Wittgenstein's point clearly, He says: 
I~ Here we have found the reason for the Private Language argument (and his later 
works): this work is against philosophy. Remember the philosopher pointing at the tree and 
saying "I know that's a tree. ff 
ISHowever: could the basisoflanguage be hard-wired into us, and thelanguagewespeak: 
simply be the program we run on top of it? 
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It is, however, possible that a very secretive diarist may not be 
satisfied with putting familiar words into an unfamiliar notation, 
but may prefer to invent new words: the two processes are in any 
case not sharply distinct. Ifbe carries his invention far enough be 
can properly be said to beemploying a pri vate language (Pitcher, 
p.250). 
Ayer is standing in the camp of the Ostensive Definitioners when he makes 
this statement. He sees naming and words as the starting point oflanguage. 
What he fails to see, however, is that the "private" language the diarist 
develops is developed from and takes the place of the original language he 
speaks: this is not a private language, but a new language that has another 
language for a background. It could easily (as much as learning a language 
is easy) be learned by someone else. A couple of questions arise: 
Wittgenstein's "S" diary: Why? This is a simple question. Why would one 
use a private language rather than the language used already by the person 
to mark when a feeling is felt, or some other private action occurs? This 
serves no PU1JXlse, other than to make a list (as if one would do this for a 
doctor or a class, reports, etc.), and is in essence a meaningless activity. To 
see the end of it all for Ayer: he comes down to descriptions and descriptive 
language-in effect, you need descriptions of things, even for yourself, and 
the language is the key to the description. Each name is related to a 
description. The names must be removed, says Wittgenstein: Ostensive 
Definitions cause far more problems than they are worth. Ayer does not see 
that in order to attach a description to aname one cannot just name first: one 
must be able to articulate the description; i.e., one must have a language that 
name and description fit into. The structures must be there in the first place, 
or there is nowhere for a word or definition to reside. Naming is a part of the 
bigger language: language does not come from naming. 
To Conclude: 
Ayer missed the point by a long shot. Hel6 has removed (Isolated) the 
argument and is treating it as if it can be separated from the rest of the 
Philosophical Investigations. He does not see the rest of the forest and is 
liable to brain himself if he is not careful. Wittgenstein was illustrating and 
using the argument to strengthen the rest of his thesis-he never intended for 
16 Ayer is not the philosopher looking at the tree and saying "I know that is a tree." 
Instead, he says, "That is a tree" "that is grass" "That is sky." 
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it to gain a life ofits own.171bis again shows how philosophers have a habit 
of philosophical thinking. not of real thinking.18 Ayer is exactly what 
Wittgenstein is fighting: the philosopher who putters about in meaningless 
philosphicallanguage games.19 
Alice thought to herself, "Then there's no use in speaking." The 
voices didn't join in this time, as she hadn't spoken, but, to her 
great surprise, they all thought in chorus (I hope you understand 
what thinking in chorus means-for 1must confess that I don't), 
"Better say nothing at all. Language is worth a thousand pounds 
a word!" 
-Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass 
I1Wittgenstein touched Philosophy's collective nerve when he brought up this subject. 
Why is Private Language something that is fought over? What does it matter? I believe that 
Wittgenstein knew how otherphilosophers would react to bis ideas. To him the argument was 
support for his thesis and not much else. For other philosophers, it became their route to 
employment... Whar does it matter? is an enquiry that must eventually be made so we can 
better know the psychology of philosophers (note: psychology makes the same mistakes as 
philosophy). 
II Remember the language game: context (depth grammar) controls the mellning. By 
removing the argument, the depth grammar is ignored, and the argument hilS no sense in its 
original sense. I do not know if Wittgenstein would say it has any sense at all. 
19 What of "Words we cannot say?" When we know something, and understand it-we 
sometimes cannot express it in the language we speak. This implies II problem with our 
spoken language. 
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